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'bhe Internet, which began in the late 1960s as a project of the United States Department of
th~fence to establish a decentralised computer networ~ to connect the military, university and
. ~e.fence sectors, has today transformed .tnto a virtual place where all kinds of human
~CtIvlhes take place. Businessmen were qUIck to realise the potential significance of the
nternet as a medium to facilitate the establishment of international linkages between buyers
and sellers who were thousands of miles apart. With the rise of e-commerce new marketing
~~ . I 'egles were developed to reach out to al groups of consumers. Numerous web sites were
~reated by sellers to advertise their products and search engines were developed to enable
nternet users to navigate the vast cyberspace for information they were interested in. The
usefulness of search engines to advertisers and Internet users soon turned the business activity
~~Internet. a?~ertising into an important reve~ue stream for Internet search engine provi?ers.
adthough initially, such advertising was rnainlv un_tar?e~ed, the trend in recent years IS to
Opt an approach which is more targeted to the mdlvldual Internet user. Today, Internet
search companies offer targeted advertising programmes through paid advertisements. These
~vertising programmes, also known as keyword advertising, provide a huge revenue for
ternet search companies. 2
In d rtili . recent years, the practice of keyword a ve Ismg has been the subject of trademark
1~lgationin a number of countries because the keywords sold by Internet search providers to
~~gger advertisements in response to s~ecific search. te~s are ~t times identical o~ s.imilar to
ale tra~e marks belonging to third partIes. Legal aC.tlons involving keyword advertising ~ften
lege Issues of trade mark infringement or passing off. The purpose of this paper IS to
examine how Malaysian courts might respond to legal issues arising from Internet keyword
~dvertising under trade mark law. In doing so, this pa~er reviews some leading cases on
. eyword advertising in the United States and the United Kingdom which involved the
Intersection between keyword advertising and trade. ~ark law:' in order to glean the approach
of courts in those jurisdictions to keyword ~dvertlsmg. The paper, then examines how the
Malaysian courts might respond to the legal ISSuesposed by the practice of Internet keyword
adVertising in the light of developments in the U.S. and the U.K.
'E . "
2 Illall: tayps@um.edu.my
Por instance, Google's revenue for the first quarte.r of 20~7 was US$3.~6 billion, wi~h 99% of t~e
revenue coming from online advertising. On this, see Google Dominates Q1 With $3.66B m
Revenue' at <http://blogs.salesforce.comiadwords/2007/04/index.html>(last visited on 12 October
3 2007). .
There have been court cases on keyword advertising III ot~er countries as well, such as in Franc~ a~d,
~ore recently, in Australia. On 12 July 2007, the Australian Competition and Consumer.comm)s.~~;
Instituted legal proceedings in the Australian Federal Court against the search engme pro~)'nk'
Google. The Commission alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in relation t? spon.s?re~ 1 .s
that appeared on the Google website. This action is the first keyword advertISIng litigatIon In
Australia.
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Keyword Advertising - Some Background Facts
During the early years of the World Wide Web, search engines were developed to assist
Internet users to locate specific web sites by returning search result listings which were based
on the search terms typed in by the Internet users. Search engines operate by indexing Internet
content and ranking websites using varying criteria. Many search engines use automated
means, which are programmes called web crawlers, web robots or web spiders to continually
visit web pages in a methodical manner for inclusion in their databases. The search engine
will index the downloaded pages to provide fast searches. In indexing websites, some search
engines look for search words in the website's metatags that contain keyword information
about the website's contents." The consequence of this is that every time a search engine user
types in a search term, the search results will display a list of sites which use that term, either
in visible or metatag form. Search engines also rank websites in order to determine which
web sites will be returned at the top of the search results list. The order in which search results
appear in the search results page is a matter for the particular search engine's secret systern.
Some search engines index and rank sites based on the popularity of the sites, such as the
number and quality of links from other sources.
When search engine providers began conducting Internet advertising as a form of businesS
with monetary returns, display advertisements and banner advertisements on all kinds of
trading activities appeared on the search results pages. Initially, Internet advertising waS
largely untargeted to any specific group of Internet users. Banner advertisements we~e
programmed to appear on the search results pages in a random manner or on a rotation bastS
and the advertisements could be unrelated to the search query typed by the user.
In recent years, search engine providers have tailored such advertising· to the needs or interests
of groups of consumers. This is done through selling advertisements which are linked to the
electronic auctioning or sale of keywords by search engine providers. The keywords alloW
advertisers to target individual users with certain interests by linking advertisements to
keywords. The advertiser chooses certain keywords which he wishes his advertisement to be
linked to when a search engine user conducts a search using any of those keywords.
Sometimes the keywords are chosen with the assistance of the search engine provider. The
triggered advertisements usually appear on the top or the right side of the search results pages
and the keywords will appear in bold. When the search engine user clicks on the
advertisement, he will be taken to the advertiser's webpage. In return for the advertising
services offered by the search engine provider, the keyword purchaser, who is also the
advertiser, nominates a maximum amount which he is willing to pay when a search eng~ne
user clicks on his advertisement. This amount is also one of the factors which will deterrntne
the ranking of the advertisement. The ranking is important because the higher a website is 011
the search results page, the more likely it is that users will actually visit those web pages.
Common search engines which adopt keyword advertising include Google, Yahoo! and MS~·
4 Metatags are HTML codes written by the website developer but are not visibly displayed 00 the
website. b
5 Banner advertisements are advertisements, either in graphic and/or text, that are displayed on we
pages. When the search engine user clicks on the advertisement, he is sent to the advertiser's home
page or a target page created by the advertiser. It is often the case that banner advertisements stretch
across the top portion of the search results page.
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Google's pay-per-click advertising programme, AdWords, offers featured listing service
~nder the heading 'Sponsored Links'. Featured listings are paid listings where the advertise;
t;S agreed to pay o~ a p.er-click basis for traffic le~ds to his website. For ins.tance, a search for
h e keyword travel using the Google search engine produces sponsored hnks to discounted
t~t~ls, flights, cruise and even study abroad because the advertisers have paid a fee to have
Meir a~vertisements appear on the page listing the search result of 'travel'. Yahoo! Search
d a~ketmg (formerly Overture Services, Inc) offers featured listing service under the
b~slgnation 'Sponsor Results'. As with Google, the fea~red l.istings sometimes appear as
Xed pastel-shaded textual advertisements that are at the nght Side of the screen or at the top
Orbottom of the search results page.
As .a result of litigation involving keyword advertising, search engine providers have adopted
Vanous policies to reduce possible conflicts with trademarks and to handle trademark
~Ornplaints. For instance, Google AdWords has a trademark complaint procedure in place to
d~lp trade m~rk owners monitor the use of their trade .marks by AdWords advertisers. Google
G es n~t arbl~at~ trademark disputes be~e~n a~vertl~ers .and trademar~ owners." However,
. o.ogle s pohcy IS that it will perform a limited mvestIgatlOn of complamts. If the complaint
~ In relat~on to. a trade marked term in a j~risd~cti.on.outside the. United States or Canada,
~ogle Will review the complaint and the review IS limited to ensunng that the advertisements
~t ISSueare. not using a term corresponding to the trade~ark in the advertisement text or as a
eyword tngger. If it is, Google will require the advertiser to remove the trademark from the
ahdvertisement text or keyword list and will prevent the advertiser from using the trademark in
t e future. 7 .
~~~ilarl~, Yahoo! Search Marketing requires advertis.ers to a.gree that the~r search terms, their
. hng titles and descriptions, and the content of their websites do not VIOlate the trademark
fIghts of others. In cases in which an advertiser has bid on a term that is the trademark of
an~ther, Yahoo! Search Marketing will allow the bids only if the advertiser presents content
lik It~website that (a) refers to the trade mark or its owner in a manner w~ich does not create a
kehhood of consumer confusion (for example, sale of a product beanng the trademark, or
Commentary, criticism or other permissible information about the trade mark owner or its
product) or (b) uses the term in a generic or merely descriptive manner.
8
The Two Main Issues Discussed
~his paper examines the conflict between the practice of keyword advertising and trademark
rights under Malaysian law. In doing so, it examines two main issues posed by keyword
~dvertising. Firstly, do advertisemen~s w_hich ar~ triggered by t~e use of a trad~ mark as
eYWord create a likelihood of confuSIOn in the minds of the public that the advertised goods
Or services originate from the trade mark owner? Secondly, does the sale of keywords which
:re .trademarks belonging to third parties an:ou~t to 'use of the .t'rademarks: by the search
ngIne providers or the advertiser? An exammatlOn of the above Issues requires a survey of
6 See 'Trademark Complaint Procedure' at <http://www.google.comltm_complaint_adwords.html>
7 (last visited on 11 October 2007).
See 'How do I file a trademark complaint outside the U.S. and Canada?' at
<<::http://adwords.google.comlsupportlbinlanswer.py?answer=50007&topic=26> (last visited on 11
8 October 2007).
~e 'Trademarks: Raising concerns about domains in the domain match pr.o?ram' at
http://searchmarketing.yahoo.comlen_HKllegaUtrademarks.phP> (last VISItedon 11 October 2007).
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the approaches of the courts in other jurisdictions with regard to this aspect. As mentioned
earlier, the paper will look at the developments in the US and the UK.
Keyword advertising in the US and the UK
I. The United States of America
Legal uncertainty exists over whether the practice of keyword advertising amounts to trade
mark infringement under US trademark law. The courts dealing with keyword advertising
often have to address the issues of whether there was a 'likelihood of confusion', which is the
touchstone of trademark infringement under US law, and whether the use of the keyword
amounts to a use of the trademark in commerce.
Is There Likelihood of Confusion ?
In the United States, a number of keyword advertising cases have arisen in the courts in
different circuits. Some of the leading reported cases involved actions brought by trademark
owners against search engine providers for trademark infringement. There were also a few
cases where the actions were brought against the keyword purchasers, who were the
advertisers. Some of the arguments in the cases were based on the controversial doctrine of
- initial interest confusion. The doctrine of initial interest confusion was first applied to the
Internet by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Broolifield Communications, I~c
v West Coast Entertainment Corp.' Initial interest confusion arises when a customer IS
initially confused and this confusion leads to an interest in a competitor's product. 10 Altho~gh
the confusion is dispelled before an actual sales occurs, initial interest confuSlo.n
impermissibly capitalises on the goodwill associated with a mark. This doctrine IS
controversial in the US and some courts have not looked at it favourably. I I In Brookfield
Communications case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit illustrated the application of
the doctrine as follows: 12
Suppose West Coast's competitor (Blockbuster) ... puts up a billboard on a
highway reading - 'West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7' --- where West
Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers
looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for
it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the
highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West
Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since
there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense:
they are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no
reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West
Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not
alter the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired
goodwill. (italics mine)
9 174 F 3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999).
10 Ibid at 1062-1063.
II See, for instance, the judgment of Judge Berzon, who is the concurring Circuit Judge, in PlayboY
Enterprises, Inc v Netscape Communications Corporation 354 F 3d 1020 (9th Cir 2004).
II Ibid at 1025.
12 Supra n8 at 1064.
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~he first reported keyword advertising case in the United States is Playboy Enterprises, Inc v
C~:sc,:pe Commu~ications Corporation. l~ In that .case, the U~ Court of Appeals ~or the Ninth
b CUlt.had to decide whether search engine providers were hable for trademark infringement
. Yselhng to advertisers the trademarks which belonged to third parties which were not related
lis any way to the advertisers. The defendants, who were Netscape and Excite, had various
l~ts of terms to which they linked advertisers' banner advertisements. Advertisers who
~lshed t? purchase keyword banner advertis~ments fro~ Netscape an? Excite had to choose
om a hst of terms. One of the lists dealt with adult-onented entertamment. That list had a
package of more than 400 terms but two of them became the subject of the litigation. They
~ere 'playboy' and 'playmate'. The defendants required adult-oriented companies to link their
li vertIsements to the words in the list. None of the terms could be deleted from the packaged
the When.a search engine user types in 'playboy' or 'playmate' or one of the terms in the list,
PIe advertIser's ~anner advertisements will appear on the search r~sults p~ge. The plaintiff,
'Payboy Enterpnses, Inc, claimed that the defendants were using their 'Playboy' and
D.lay.mate' trademarks in a manner. that infri~ged. upon their marks. T.he United States
d lstnct Court for the Central Distnct of CahfornIa awarded summary Judgement to the
efe?dants in the year 2000 on the basis that 'playboy' and 'playmate' were words in common
Use III the English language. An appeal was brought by the plaintiff to the United States Court
de Appeals for the Ninth Circuit against the grant of the summary judgment in favour of the
efendants.
At.the appeal, the main issue for consideration was whether the defendants' action resulted in
a lIkelihood of confusion. A fortiori, the court examined whether there was a triable issue in a
~:se where a trademark was sold to third parties as a keyw~rd by a search engi~e provider and
e keyword, if typed in by a search engine user, would tngger banner advertisements which
:eere in actual ~a~t not related to the trad~~~rk .owner. The pl~intiff argu~d strongly th~t ~he
SoYword advertising was likely to create initial mt~rest C?nfu~l~~. Accor~mg to the plaintiff,
b me consum~rs, initially seeking the plai~ti~f s Slt~S,might ~mtIally ?elIeve. that unla~el~ed
ranner a?V~rtlsements were links to the plamtlff s ~ltes or to slte~ affilIated WIth the pl~I~t1ff.
he plaintiff asserted that by keying adult-onented advertIsements to the plaintiff's
~r:demarks, the defendants ~ctively created initia~ interest confusion. Suc~ confusio~ a~ose
cause banner advertisements appeared ImmedIately after users typed in the plaintiff's
trademarks. The plaintiff asserted that users were likely to be confused regarding the
sPonsorship of unlabelled banner advertisements. The plaintiff also argued that because of the
Use_rs'.confusion, they might follow the instruction, believing the?, would be connected to the
plamtIffs website. Even if they realised immediately upon accessing the competitor's site that
they had reached a site wholly unrelated to the plaintiffs, the damage would have been done
~t that point because the search engine user, as a potential customer, would have been
~~trod~ced to the advertiser. The plaintiff c~aimed that t?e. defendants, in con}unction with the
toVertlser~, had misappropriated the goodwIll of the plamtlffs marks by leadmg.I~t~rn~t users
Cothe plamtiffs competitors' websites. The court a?r.eed that the theory of mlt1al mte~est
. nfuSlOn applied in the context of keyword advertlsmg. However., one of the concurrmg
tUdges, Judge Marsha S Berzon, was not rece~tive of the i.nitial i~terest confusion theory
Because he thought that it might inhibit the practIce of presentmg ch~lces to consumers. Judge
erzon suggested that the court should consider whether the doctrme should be allowed to
Co t'n lllue to apply.
13
SUpra niO.
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In determining whether the plaintiffs argument on the basis of initial interest confusion
satisfied the likelihood of confusion test, the Ninth Circuit court applied the eight-factor test
used in traditional US trade mark infringement actions. Those eight factors were as follows:
i) strength of the mark,
ii) proximity of the goods,
iii) similarity of the marks,
iv) evidence of actual confusion,
v) marketing channels used,
vi) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser,
vii) defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and
viii) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Looking first at factor (iv), which the court considered to be the most important determining
factor in the case, the court examined an expert study conducted for the plaintiff which
suggested a strong likelihood of initial interest confusion among consumers. The court the
results of the study as evidence of confusion.
Apart from factor (iv), the court also took into account the other factors in the test. The court
emphasised that they were considering a situation in which the defendants displayed
competitors' unlabelled banner advertisements, with no label or overt comparison to the
plaintiff, after Internet users typed in the plaintiffs trademarks. The court said that if a banner
advertisement clearly identified its source, no confusion would occur. 14 However, in this case,
there was no label on the advertisement. That in itself would dismiss the summary judgment
in favour of the defendants. However, the court proceeded to look at other factors. The court
found that factor 2 favoured the plaintiff because the proximity between the plaintiffs and its
competitor's goods provided the reason the defendants keyed the 'plaintiffs marks to the
competitor's banner advertisements in the first place. Factor 3, dealing with the similarity of
the marks, was not at all in issue since the marks were identical. Factor 5 also favoured the
plaintiff since the marketing channels were the same, that is, the Internet. Factor 6 favoured
the plaintiff as well because the consumer's care for inexpensive products was expected to be
quite low which would, in turn, increase the likelihood of confusion. Also, the average
searcher seeking adult-oriented materials on the Internet would be easily diverted from a
specific product he is seeking if other options, particularly graphic ones, appeared more
quickly. With regard to factor 7, the court accepted evidence that the defendants did not do
anything to prevent click-throughs that resulted from confusion. The court thought that a waY
of reducing confusion was to label the banner advertisements but the defendants had failed to
do so because they did not require that the advertisers identify themselves on their banner
advertisements. Moreover, the defendants profited from such click-throughs. Although the
defendants controlled the content of the advertisements, they did not require the advertisers to
identify themselves on their banner advertisements. Moreover, they did not label the
advertisements themselves. In addition, the defendants refused to remove the highly-rated
terms 'playboy' and 'playmate' from their list of keywords, even when the advertisers
requested that they did so. The court found that factor 8, which dealt with the likelihood of
expansion of product lines, was irrelevant because the advertiser's goods and the plaintiffs
were related.
14 Ibid at 1024 n16.
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!ased on. the above findings, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
at genume issues of material fact existed as to the plaintiff s trademark infringement claim
~nd reversed the district court's earlier grant of summary j~dg~ment in favour of the
ef~ndants. The Court of Appeals then sent the case back to the district court to be tried on its
~en~s. However, before a final resolution of the infringement issues could be reached by the
Istnct court, the parties settled the case on undisclosed terms.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals in Playboy Enterprises case thought that it was important to
lUake a distinction between the situation where a banner advertisement clearly identified its
source. and the situation in which the defendants displayed competitors' triggered
adVertIsements which had rio label or did not identify its source. In the former situation, the
Court opined that there would be no confusion. In the latter situation, the court held that the
sale of a keyword which was also the trademark of another entity was likely to cause
Confusion and was actionable as trademark infringement.
~hile Playboy Enterprises case was the first reported keyword advertising case in the US, the
~rst US keyword advertising case that went to trial w~s C?overnment Employees Insurance
V?rnf~ny v Google, Inc. 15 Itwas a decision of the US District Court for the Eastern District of
CIrgmla released in August 2005. The pl~intiff was the Government. E~ployees Insurance
Ompany (GEICO), which was a large US msurance company. The plaintiff brought an eight-
COuntcomplaint against the defendants, Google, Inc and Overture Services, Inc for, inter alia,
trade mark infringement. The defendants sold the 'GEICO' trademark to advertisers such that
When a search user typed in the keyword 'GEICO' using the defendants' search engines, the
~earch r~sults page would produce sponsored links from the def~ndants' keyword offering.
a he plaintiff alleged that the defendants had unlawfully use~ Its trademark by allowing
d~ertlsers to bid on the trade mark and pay defendants to be linked to that trademark. The
plamtiff therefore alleged that the defendants were liable for tr~de ~ark infringement. The
defendants applied to dismiss the action arguing that there was no infringement,
The key issue before the court was whether Internet users who conducted a search on
GEICO' were confused or misled by the advertisements that Google generated for its paid
adVertisers. Judge Brinkema considered the case under two situations. The first situation was
Where the defendants followed their stated trade mark policy and did not permit
advertisements keyed to the 'GEICO' trademark to display 'GEICO' marks in the heading or
text. In that situation the court held that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence
of consumer confusion. The second situation is where the defendants did not follow their
S~atedtrademark policy and advertisements triggered by a .sear~h using 'GEICO' trademark
d~Splayed 'GEICO' mark in the headings or text. In that situation, the defendants could not
dISprove confusion as evident from the survey which the plaintiff had earlier conducted. The
court was of the view that the defendants' offer of the plaintiffs trademark for use in
adVertiSing could falsely identify a business relationship or licensing a?reement ~etween the
de~en?ants and the plaintiff. When the defendants sold the nght.s to link adv~rtlsing to the
PI~mtIff's trademark, the defendants were using the trade mark in commerce m a way that
mI~ht imply that the defendants had permission from the trade mark owner to do so. The
Plamtiff s claim for trade mark infringement was allowed.
15
330 F Supp 2d 700.
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Does Keyword Advertising Constitute Use of the Trademarks in Commerce?
Recent decisions involving actions against keyword purchasers, instead of search engine
providers, demonstrate the difference in approach of the courts to keyword advertising. In
Edina Realty, Inc v TheMl.Sonltne.com." the plaintiff, Edina Realty, was a well-known real
estate agency. The defendant, TheMLSonline.com, was an online realty agency. The
defendant purchased keywords at Google and Yahoo! comprising variations of the rerrn
'Edina' that displayed sponsored links to the defendant's website. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for inter alia trade mark infringement.
The court held that keyword purchases could constitute the commercial use of a trademark for
the purpose of trademark infringement. The court stated that:
While not a conventional 'use in commerce', defendant nevertheless uses the Edina
Realty mark commercially. Defendant purchases search terms that include the
Edina Realty mark to generate its sponsored link advertisement. ... Based on the
plain meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms is a use in
commerce.
The court also found that there was a likelihood of confusion. Thus, the court refused a motion
by the defendant to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for trade mark infringement.
In contrast, in Merck & Co, Inc v Mediplan Health Consulting.t' which was decided ten dayS
later on 30 March 2006, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that the sale of trademarks as keywords for sponsored links did not constitute Use
for the purpose of a trademark infringement action. The case involved a number of Canadia.n
Internet pharmacies and manufacturers of a generic version of the drug Zocor. Zocor IS
manufactured by Merck, who is the plaintiff in the case. The defendants, who were the
Internet pharmacies and manufacturers of the generic version of Zocor paid Google and
Yahoo! to have advertisements displayed when a search engine user searched the keyword
'Zocor'. The plaintiff brought the action for inter alia trademark infringement. The
defendants argued that the purchase of the keyword 'Zocor' did not constitute trademark
infringement and applied to dismiss the infringement claim. The court concluded that the
'internal use of the mark. 'Zocor' as a keyword to trigger the display of sponsored links is not
use of the mark in a trademark sense." The court, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs trade
mark infringement claim.
A conclusion similar to that of the Mediplan case was reached in the subsequent case
Rescuecom Corp v Google, Inc. 19 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Google sold the trade
mark 'Rescuecom' to the plaintiffs competitors as a keyword that triggered the competitor~
sponsored links to appear on the search results page when an Internet user entere
'Rescuecom' as a search term. The court held that Google's internal use of the plaintiff}
trademark to trigger sponsored links was not a use of a trademark within the context a
trademark infringement because there was no allegation that Google placed the plaintiffs
trademark on any goods, containers, displays or advertisements or that its internal use was
162006 WL 737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006).
17 425 F Supp 2d 402.
18 Ibid at 415.
19456 F Supp. 2d 393 (NDNY 2006).
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~ifisi?leto the public, The court concluded that such conduct did not amount to trademark
IU nngement.
~ Google, Inc v American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc,20 which was decided recently,
F Oogle sold keywords comprising trademarks belonging to American Blind & Wallpaper
actory, Inc so that those keywords would trigger sponsored links on Google's search results
p~ges '.~he issue was whether Google had infringed the plaintiffs trademarks by its keyword
~avertIsmg practice .. G~ogle filed action for declarat?1f relief ?f nO?-infringement of
de~e~ark~. Aft.er reviewing a number of keyword advertlSlng cases mclu~m~ the conflicting
N CISlonsm Edina Realty, Mediplan and Rescuecom, Judge Fogel of the District Court for the
h Ort?ern District of California took the view that he 'necessarily must be guided by the
c~ldmg ~f t?e leading Nint~ Circuit case i~ this area, Playbo~ Enterprises ~ Netscape
C mmumcatlOns Corp.' The Judge stated that m Playboy Enterprzses case, the Nmth Circuit
oun made an implicit finding of trademark use in commerce. The court concluded that the
::le of tra?emarked terms in the Google Ad~ords programme amounted ~o use of a
adem.ark m commerce. The judge then considered whether there was a likelihood of
~onfuslOn. The plaintiff argued that there was a likelihood of confusion based on the initial
I~terest confusion doctrine. The plaintiff tendered as evidence an expert survey report which
s OWedconfusion among respondents, after being shown a Google search results page for the
~:try 'American Blind Factory' and 'American Blind Wallpaper Factory'. The court accepted
, e study as relevant to the extent that the plaintiff s claims were based upon the marks
~merican Blind Factory' and 'American Blind Wallpaper Factory'. Fogel J examined the
eIght-factor test, discussed in Playboy Enterprises case, to determine whether a 'likelihood of
Confusion' existed. Firstly, the goods offered by the defendants linked to by sponsored links
as a result of the purchase of trademarks as keywords were in close proximity with those
~fered by the plaintiff. Secondly, the terms 'Ameri~an Blind Factory' and 'American Blind
allpaper Factory', which were sold by Google III the AdWords programme, were the
~rademarks of the plaintiff and were similar to the keywords at issue. Thirdly, the plaintiff had
Introduced evidence that a low degree of consumer care should be expected of Internet
CO?sumers and that many did not identify which results were sponsored. Fourthly, the
~vld~nce suggested that Google used the mark with the intent to maximize its own profit, so
;e ~ntent factor favoured the plaintiff. The court concluded th~t those factors suPP?rted a
IindI.ng that there was sufficient evidence t? cr~at~ a tn~ble. Issue of fact re~ardIllg the
/eh.hood of confusion. Therefore, Google failed in ItS applIcatIOn for sum~ary Judgment to
~~mlss t~e pl~intiffs claim. However, before the matter proceeded to trial, the plaintiff
thdrew ItS SUItagainst Google pursuant to a settlement agreement.
A.lthough the opportunity for a further examination of the legality of keyword advertising in
the United States did not materialise in American Blind & Wallpaper Factory case, a new suit
was filed in August 2007 by American Airlines against Google in the US District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth. In that action, American Airlines alleged that
~oogl~ had infringed on the airline's trademarks .by usi~g.those ~arks for keyword~triggered
CoVertlsements paid by other companies. ~mencan Airlines, beI~g a more financially able
k mpany may see this case through to tnal and, hopefully, clanfy some legal aspects of
eYword advertising practice.
20
2007 US Dist LEXIS 32450.
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II. The United Kingdom
In the year 2004, the En9lish Court of Appeal in Reed Executive pic & Anor v Reed BusinesSInformation Ltd & Ors I had occasion to consider whether keyword advertising was an
infringement of trademarks as well as passing off. The respondents, Reed Executive pIc,
owned a nationwide employment agency that advertised job vacancies. The respondents also
registered the trademark 'Reed' in relation to employment agency services. In 1995, the
respondents started using the Internet as a business tool and advertised job vacancies on its
website <www.reed.co.uk>. The appellants were Reed Business Information Ltd, Reed
Elsevier (UK) Ltd and totaljobs.com Ltd. They were companies within the large multinational
publishing group, commonly referred to as 'Reed Elsevier'. For many years, the appellants
had published a wide range of magazines and journals which carried, among others, large
sections devoted to job advertisements. Eventually, the appellants also started using the
Internet and placed on-line versions of its magazines which included job advertisements at the
website <www.totaljobs.com>. The appellants paid Yahoo! for a 'totaljobs' banner
advertisements linked to the search term 'recruitment', 'job' and 'Reed'. The respondents
alleged that the appellants' web sites which contained the word 'Reed' constituted passing off
and infringement of registered trademarks. At the hearing of the trial, the trial judge found that
there had been both passing off and infringement of trademarks.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Pumfrey J dealt with both the infringement of trademarks
and passing off issues. As regards infringement of trademarks, the judge laid down the
provision relevant to the case, which was Article 5(1) of the First Council Directive
891104IEEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks:
The registered trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein.
The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent
from using in the course of trade:
a) Any sign which is identical with the trademark in relation to goods or
services which are identical with those for which the trademark is
registered;
b) Any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the
trademark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered
by the trademark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association
between the sign and the trademark.
Pumfrey J considered whether or not the respondents' and appellants' marks were identical or
similar. The appellants had never used the mark 'Reed' alone but in their logos and either as
part of the composite 'Reed Elsevier' mark or as part of the composite 'Reed BusineSs
Information' mark. After reviewing earlier decisions of the European Court of Justice on the
determination of whether two or more marks were similar, the judge concluded that the
parties' marks were not identical. According to the judge, 'Reed' was a common surname.
The average consumer would recognise the additional words as serving to differentiate the
appellants trademark from the respondents. The judge stated that he did not think the
additional words 'Business Information' would go unnoticed by the average consumer as
21 [2004] EWCA Civ 159.
296
The Intersection between Keyword Advertising and Trademark Rights in Malaysia
thes~ words were as prominent as the word 'Reed'. This conclusion therefore ruled out the
applIcation of Article lO(1)(a) of the Directive in that case.
'The court also held that both parties' services were not identical, but were similar in that they
W~reclosely related, because they dealt with the sort of service that a jobseeker or employer
mIght use. The respondents' business was in relation to 'employment agency services'. The
appellants argued that their 'totaljobs' website had never offered such services. The appellants
~tated that their site was a searchable jobs advertisement site and merely provided job
lUfonnation, with no responsibility for it in law or as a matter of commerce. According to the
appellant, an employer would not blame 'totaljobs' ifan employee who was found through the
SIte proved unsuitable. The judge agreed with this and concluded that this fact further
SUpported his view that Article lO(1)(a) did not apply in the case.
;humfrey J then considered whether Article IO(I).(b) .applied in the c.ase. Pumfrey J held that
b ere ~as no trademark infringement under the likelihood o~ confusion s~andard, as required
y Article 5(1)(b), because the triggered advertisements did not contain the term 'Reed'.
~Owever, he stated that there might be infringement based on the likelihood of confusion test
If a search engine user clicked on the banner, and was confused by the contents of the
Underlying website. However, such confusion did not arise from the banner advertisement per
se The judge stated as follows:22
The banner itself referred only to totaljobs - there was no visible appearance of the
word Reed at all .... I cannot see that causing the unarguably inoffensive-in-itself
banner to appear on a search under the name 'Reed' or 'Reed jobs' can amount to
an Art. 5.1 (b) infringement. The web-using member of the public knows that all
s~rts of banners appear when he or she does a search and they are or may be
tnggered by something in the search. He or she al.so kno~s that searches produce
fuzzy results _ results with much rubbish thrown In. The Idea that a search under
the name Reed would make anyone think there was a trade connection between a
totaljobs banner making no reference to the word 'Reed' and Reed Employment is
fanciful. No likelihood of confusion was established.
~ith ,regard to the issue of passing off, Pumfr~y J held ~hat the use by the appellants of the
rerm Reed' to trigger 'totaljobs' banner a?VertI~eme~t .dId not amount to passing ~ff. In this
egard, Pumfrey J disagreed with the trial Judge s deCISIOnthat there had been passmg off by
~Ubstitution. 23 Briefly, passing off by substitut~on occurs where a trader havin~ accepted an
rd~r for brand X supplies brand Y in such circumstances that the customer IS unhkely to
notIce the substitution and is thus misled.24 According to Pumfrey J, passing off by
SUbstitution was 'a hundred miles from a consumer conducting a search under the name Reed
and fi . . . h hi h ' 25inding a banner which on its face has no connectIOn Wit IS searc term. However,
PumtI:ey J acknowledged that if a search engine u~er clicked through and found misleading
matenal on the site there could be passing off which arose as a result of the content of the
website linked to the banner advertisement and not the Yahoo! use.
22
231b!d at para [140], [141).
24 ~~d at para [143).
zs id.
Ibid.
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Keyword Advertising in Malaysia: A Legal Commercial Activity?
The question as to whether keyword advertising is legal in Malaysia has not been tested by the
courts as yet. As with other countries, the conflict between keyword advertising and
trademark rights entails an examination of the trademark infringement provision under the
Malaysian Trade Marks Act 1976. In addition, being a which is based on English common
law traditions, the law of passing off is also relevant.
1) Registered Trademark Infringement Under Malaysian Trademarks Act 1976
Under Malaysian trademark law, the registration of a trademark confers on the registered
proprietor the exclusive right to the use of the trademark in relation to those goods or services
for which it is registered. This is provided in section 35 of the Trade Marks Act 1976, which is
the federal statute dealing with trademarks in Malaysia. The infringement provision in section
38(1)(a) of the Act states that a registered trademark is infringed by an unauthorised person
who uses, in the course of trade, an identical or similar trademark as is likely to deceive or
cause confusion and in relation to goods or services within the scope of the registration in
such a manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being use as a trademark.
In an action for infringement of a registered trade mark under section 38(1)(a), the onus is on
the plaintiff, who may either be the registered proprietor or the registered user, to establish the
following elements: 26
(i) the defendant's mark is identical with or nearly resembling the registered trade mark
as is likely to deceive or cause confusion,
(ii) the defendant is not the registered proprietor nor the registered user of the trade
mark,
(iii) the use was in the course of trade,
(iv) the use was in relation to goods or services within the scope of registration, and
(v) the use was likely to be taken as a trade mark use
The determination of elements (i) and (ii) depends on the application of traditional trademark
law principles and is not controversial. 27 With regard to element (iv), the infringement
provision under the Trade Marks Act 1976 is confined to the situation where the defendant
uses the trademark for goods or services which are within the registered proprietor's scope of
registration. This differs from the trademark infringement provision in many other countrieS
where infringement may take place even if the registered trademark is used on similar goods
or services. In keyword advertising, the advertiser purchases the keyword which is also the
trademark of others so that his advertisements would be triggered in the search results page.
The advertiser need not be conducting trade in the same goods or services as that of the
trademark owner. Indeed, it is not uncommon that the advertiser's business is merely
tenuously similar to that of the trade mark owner. As a result of the different types of businesS
between the trademark owner and the advertiser, an action for trademark infringement may be
difficult to sustain.
26 Fabrique Ebel Societe Anonyme v Syarikat Perniagaan Tukang Jam City Port & Drs [1988] 1 MLJ
188.
27 For a summary of the principles applied in determining the existence or otherwise of these elements,
see Tay, PS, Protection of Well-Known Trade Marks in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Sweet & MaxWeIl
Asia, 2007) at 86-91.
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Insofar as element (iii) is concerned, namely, that the trademark must be used in the course of
trade, section 3(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1976 provides that references to the use of a mark
are to be construed as reference to the use of a printed or other visual representation of the
~ark. The requirement of 'printed or visual representation' may be difficult to satisfy because
t e keywords are often embodied in the metatags of the web pages, which are not visible on
the ~omputer screen. Another issue arises from the fact that many trademarks are registered in
styhzed forms or as part of composite marks. The infringement provision requires that the use
~f the trad~mark should be a. ~se of an identi~al or a similar mark as that of th~ defendant.
OWever, in keyword advertising, the advertiser purchases and the search engine provider
sells the trademark in text. form without all the remaining aspects of the trademark. In the
~bsence of the advertiser or search engine provider using the trademark in its registered form,
It may be contended that the defendant had not used an identical or similar trademark.
~ur.suant to element (v), the defendant must have used the mark as a trademark, that is, to
i~dIcate the ori~in of the goods or services in re.lati~n to wh~ch the tradema~k is used. This is
nked to the existence of a likelihood of confusion m the minds of the public as to the origin
of th~ goods or services. As pointed out in the Playboy Enterprises case, triggered
adVertIsements may be categorised into two groups. The first category of advertisements is
those that clearly identify the advertiser as the source of the advertisement or contain other
words that do not associate the advertisements with the trademark owner. Where triggered
adVertisements are labeled it can hardly be said that search engine users would be confused
that the advertisements originate from the trademark owner. The second category of
~dvertisements is those which are unlabelled or those. w~ich. display ~he tr~demarked
eYWords. Search engine users may be confused at that point in time and might click on the
adVertisements. In doing so, the search engine user will be brought to the advertiser's site and
:Vould realise that it is not the trademark owner's goods or services. The American doctrine of
i~itial interest confusion has not been tested i? Malaysia and i~ unlikely t? find. fa~our with
.cal courts. Infringement cases in Malaysia have so far involved direct infringement
SItuations. Contributory infringement is not a facet of Malaysian trademark law. It is,
therefore, submitted that keyword advertisements are unlikely to constitute infringement of
trademarks.
2) The Law of passing Off
The law of passing off is concerned with misrepresentations made by one trader which
damage the goodwill of another.28 The theoretical basis for an action in passing off is the
Protection of a property right which the plaintiff has in the goodwill of his business." In
Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd,30 Lord Diplock in the House of Lords laid
do,:"n five minimum requirements which must be established by the plaintiff in a passing off
actIon. These five requirements are as follows:
(i) misrepresentation
(ii) made by a trader in the course of trade
(iii) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services
supplied by him
28
29 Spalding (AG) & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd(1915) 32 RPC 273.
30 Ibid.
[1980] RPC 31 at 93.
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(iv) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the
sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence)
(v) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the
action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.
The practice of keyword advertising raises the issue of whether there is misrepresentation by
the keyword purchaser and the search engine provider because the search engine user reaches
the website by using the trademark. In the usual situation, a misrepresentation occurs where
the actions of the defendant indicate to consumers that his goods or services originate from the
plaintiff. There are no restrictions as to the types of representations that may constitute
passing off. In addition, there is no necessity for the misrepresentation to be conscious,
deliberate or fraudulent. It is unlikely that triggered advertisements will be regarded as a form
of misrepresentation because the search engine user will realise upon clicking at the
advertisement that it is not the plaintiff's website. Thus, it is submitted that keyword
advertising does not amount to passing off in Malaysia.
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